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INTRODUCTION 
Indeed, the most important thing to know about the nature of prejudice 
is that it is ever present in human behavior and cognition. It remains 
sufficiently in the background such that it eludes conscious awareness 
and immediate individual control, yet it is often consequential in everyday 
life. Its capacity to affect social judgment and behavior without personal 
animus or hostility is dismissed or ignored at some peril . . . .1 
Prisons are closed institutions, with little transparency or oversight.2 Judicial 
oversight of prison administrative decisions is deferential in almost every respect. 
Courts apply deferential standards of review to a range of prison administrative 
decisions, from the restriction of otherwise fundamental rights3 to discipline of the 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law; Yale ( J.D.); Princeton 
(M P.A). Thanks to Jean Ewing, Jancy Hoeffel, Robert Verchick, and Loyola University New 
Orleans’s faculty colloquium for thoughtful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Brittany 
Beckner, Emma Douglas, Annie McBride, and Emily Posner for dedicated research assistance for this 
Article and to the Dean of Loyola University New Orleans College of Law for financial support 
during the writing of this Article. I would also like to thank Professor Mario Barnes, the UC Irvine Law 
Review, and all of the hardworking students and staff for providing a place to discuss these issues at 
the CLEaR symposium on “The Interplay of Race, Gender, Class, Crime and Justice.” 
1. Curtis D. Hardin & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Nature of Implicit Prejudice: Implications for Personal 
and Public Policy, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 13, 23 (Eldar Shafir ed., 
2013). 
2. Andrea C. Armstrong, No Prisoner Left Behind? Enhancing Public Transparency of Penal 
Institutions, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 435, 469–75 (2014). 
3. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (upholding restriction on inmate correspondence 
but denying restriction on inmate marriage). 
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incarcerated. From lesser expectations of privacy to limited rights of association 
and speech, the Supreme Court has deferred to the judgment of prison 
administrators that the curtailment of rights is essential to maintaining order and 
security within the prison walls. 
Incarceration, by definition involuntary, demands that penal institutions have 
the means to ensure compliance from the detained. Thus some abbreviation of 
rights for the incarcerated is not only understandable but also necessary. 
Moreover, penal institutions, by virtue of maintaining custody of individuals, are 
also responsible for protecting inmates from harm by other inmates and staff. 
Similarly, as employers, penal institutions must also ensure the safety of their staff. 
The threat of violence within penal institutions is real.4 Faced with balancing the 
heavy burden of protection and more searching judicial oversight, courts have 
adopted a deferential approach to the management of penal institutions.5 
Nevertheless, the people who work in these closed institutions are subject to 
the same biases and psychological phenomena as the general public. Studies 
increasingly demonstrate the prevalence of unconscious racial bias in the general 
public,6 but we have yet to examine the influence of unconscious racial bias within 
the prison system. While the intersection of prison and race is not new, only a few 
scholars have examined this intersection within the prison walls. Michelle 
Alexander’s book, The New Jim Crow, has significantly expanded the conversation 
on how criminal justice laws and policies disproportionately incarcerate African 
Americans.7 Loïc Wacquant demonstrates that our laws and policies result in the 
hyperincarceration of urban African Americans.8 Discussions about prison and 
race have, by and large, mostly focused on the demographic flows to and from 
prisons, not the potential interactions within prison walls. 
Nor has the Court engaged with the implications of unconscious racial bias 
in prison administration. Unlike the Court’s deferential review of most other 
constitutional claims by prisoners, for claims of racial discrimination in prison, the 
Court applies strict scrutiny, the most difficult level of scrutiny to satisfy.9 But to 
invoke this standard, the Court requires proof of discriminatory intent.10 Proving 
such intent is often insurmountable for plaintiffs, particularly when multiple 
decision makers are involved and the ease of cloaking improper motives in race-
 
4. Jens Modvig, Violence, Sexual Abuse, and Torture in Prisons, in PRISONS AND HEALTH 19, 19 
(Stefan Enggist et al. eds., 2014). 
5. Michael B. Mushlin & Naomi Roslyn Galtz, Getting Real About Race and Prisoner Rights, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 27, 32–35 (2008). 
6. See infra Part I. 
7. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012). 
8. Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race & Hyperincarceration in Revanchist America, DÆDALUS, Summer 
2010, at 74. 
9. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511 (2005). 
10. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (creating an intent requirement for 
allegations of disparate impact under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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neutral considerations exists.11 Despite the lack of engagement by the Court, I 
trace the ways in which unconscious racial attitudes may still play a role in prison 
disciplinary decisions and argue that the legal standards governing prison decisions 
may facilitate and validate the use of these racial norms. 
This Article surveys three previously unconnected areas of analysis: implicit 
bias, prison disciplinary rules, and judicial deference to correctional decisions. It 
traces the possible connections from the statistical evidence on the significance of 
race to the potential impact of race on prison disciplinary decisions and to the 
legal validation of these racial norms through judicial deference. In so doing, this 
Article hopes to begin a dialogue that identifies several entry points for discussing 
the ramifications of race within correctional facilities. 
In 1980, Eric Poole and Robert Regoli published a groundbreaking statistical 
analysis of the role of race in prison disciplinary decisions in a medium security 
Southern prison.12 Their analysis demonstrated that the race of an inmate was 
correlated with the disciplinary decisions of correctional officers.13 Scholars such 
as Sharon Dolovich and Philip Goodman have analyzed the role of race in 
California facilities based on extensive ethnographic research.14 Professor Michael 
Mushlin has noted that judicial standards on racial discrimination, focusing 
exclusively on discriminatory intent, fundamentally misunderstand race as a 
psychological process.15 More generally, this Article is part of a broader critical 
race praxis that incorporates social science findings to distill the ways in which 
race is embedded in our social, legal, and economic institutions.16 
Building on these important insights, I first explore how implicit bias could 
influence prison disciplinary decisions, and second, I examine the role of the law 
in validating these race-based decisions. The law arguably facilitates the influence 
of implicit bias on prison disciplinary proceedings by requiring proof of conscious 
discriminatory intent. Implicit racial biases by correctional officials may then be 
validated through judicial deference to prison disciplinary rules and decisions. 
It is also important to clearly state what this Article does not address. As 
 
11. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN L. REV. 317, 319 (1987) (recounting criticisms of the intent requirement established 
in Washington). 
12. Eric D. Poole & Robert M. Regoli, Race, Institutional Rule Breaking, and Disciplinary Response: 
A Study of Discretionary Decision Making in Prison, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 931 (1980). 
13. Id. See also infra Part II for a deeper discussion of this study. 
14. See generally Sharon Dolovich, Strategic Segregation in the Modern Prison, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1 (2011) (analyzing the role of race in her ethnographic study of Los Angeles county jail’s K6G unit 
for gay men and transgender women); Philip Goodman, “It’s Just Black, White, or Hispanic”: An 
Observational Study of Racializing Moves in California’s Segregated Prison Reception Centers, 42 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 735 (2008) (arguing that prison housing decisions are racialized through collaborative 
settlements between offenders and correctional staff based on observational study). 
15. Mushlin & Galtz, supra note 5, at 40–41. 
16. See Devon W. Carbado & Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. 
REV. L. SOC. SCI. 149, 149–51 (2014) (summarizing the increasing collaborations between critical race 
theorists and social scientists and assessing the benefits and costs of such collaborations). 
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noted earlier, there is little public information on prison disciplinary decisions, 
particularly with regard to the race of the punished inmate. There is little to no 
information about whether certain disciplinary charges are actually used or only 
exist on paper. And there are no modern studies examining unconscious biases by 
correctional employees. It is possible that race does not play a role (or at least not 
a significant one) in prison disciplinary decisions today. In over 150 interviews 
with correctional staff and inmates across three facilities in California, Professors 
Kitty Calavita and Valerie Jenness noted the “relative absence” of race during 
these discussions.17 Perhaps, as some have theorized with regards to the police,18 
race is simply less salient than one’s status as an inmate or correctional officer. 
Calavita and Jenness caution that race is clearly “embedded” in the carceral 
institution, even if race was not central to their interviews of prisoners and 
correctional staff.19 For example, they note that certain California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation facilities remain de facto racially segregated.20 
Hence, I do not argue that prison correctional officials are racially biased against 
minorities, nor do I argue that this bias is present in prison disciplinary decisions. 
Rather, this Article considers the potential implications of implicit bias research in 
the prison disciplinary context in light of existing legal doctrine. As such, this 
Article presents a thought experiment that assesses the implications of existing 
research. 
Part I of this Article discusses how implicit bias could affect prison decision-
making. Given the lack of modern psychological studies of correctional officials 
and implicit bias, this section draws on studies of implicit bias in the population at 
large as well as implicit bias in the criminal justice system. Part II discusses how 
courts may facilitate the influence of implicit race bias by requiring discriminatory 
intent, even in penal facilities where circumstances would favor allowing implicit 
bias claims. Part III examines the legal standards governing judicial review of 
prison disciplinary rules and decisions and concludes that judicial deference may 
validate the improper influence of race on prison-staff decision-making. 
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE? 
This Article starts with the premise that race is a social construct.21 While 
there may be biological markers of race, such as a person’s skin tone, facial 
features, or hair, the significance (or meaning attributed to) race is a result of 
 
17. KITTY CALAVITA & VALERIE JENNESS, APPEALING TO JUSTICE: PRISONER 
GRIEVANCES, RIGHTS, AND CARCERAL LOGIC 190 (2015). 
18. Liyah Kaprice Brown, Officer or Overseer?: Why Police Desegregation Fails as an Adequate Solution 
to Racist, Oppressive, and Violent Policing in Black Communities, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 757, 
789–90 (2005). 
19. CALAVITA & JENNESS, supra note 17, at 191. 
20. Id. at 18. 
21. Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, 
and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 (1994). 
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historical patterns of power and interactions among races.22 In American history, a 
person’s (perceived) biological race was used to structure family,23 access to the 
State,24 and goods or services.25 Laws regulated the relationships between 
members of different races.26 White supremacy in American history was built and 
maintained through ensuring the superiority of White persons in the political, 
economic, and social spheres. Moreover, White supremacy was justified through 
denigrating other races.27 Blacks were “shiftless” and “criminal.”28 People of Asian 
descent were “sneaky.”29 Latinos were “dirty” or “less intelligent.”30 While the 
Supreme Court has rejected the once-blatant discrimination of yore, many of the 
cultural tropes about the characteristics of members of particular races persist. 
We see this persistence when a White male “find[s]” food from a grocery 
store in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, whereas an African 
American in the exact situation is described as “looting.”31 Associations between 
race and character are clear when the media portrays a Black teenager killed by 
police as a “thug,”32 but a headline for a White teenager pleading guilty to killing 
 
22. See id. Professor Jerry Kang further deconstructs this idea into the following three 
steps:  
[An individual] classifies [another] individual into a (1) racial category according to relevant 
(2) mapping rules provided to us by culture and any specific rules relevant to the context. 
Once that mapping is performed—typically instantaneously—a set of (3) racial meanings is 
activated that alters the way that the perceiver interacts with the target.  
Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the Left, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1139, 1143 (2010) (citation 
omitted). 
23. For example, African American slaves lost the right to raise their children, since the 
children of slaves were considered to be property of the owner and therefore eligible for sale or legal 
transfer to a new owner. See Thomas D. Russell, Articles Sell Best Singly: The Disruption of Slave Families at 
Court Sales, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1161, 1162–63 (1996) (arguing that legal institutions facilitated the 
separation of slave families through conducting court sales and masking individual human decisions 
to sell slaves as individual and not group items). 
24. See Ex parte Shahid, 205 Fed. 812, 813 (E.D.S.C. 1913) (noting that naturalization was 
limited to free White persons and those of African descent, necessarily excluding Native Americans, 
Chinese, Japanese, and Malays from the benefits of citizenship). 
25. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
26. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down Virginia’s miscegenation law 
forbidding marriage between members of other races). 
27. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (1 Black) 393, 421–22 (1856) (arguing that the character 
of “Negroes” justified denial of U.S. citizenship for jurisdictional purposes); see, e.g., Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 543, 589 (1823) (noting the “habits” of Native American tribes also 
justified White ownership of the land). 
28. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation 
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1373 (1988). 
29. Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-
Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1241, 1258 (1993) (placing the “model minority” 
myth in context and demonstrating its harms). 
30. Juan F. Perea, Buscando América: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect Latinos, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1442–43 (2004). 
31. Cheryl I. Harris, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 907, 931 
(2006) (reviewing MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A COLOR-
BLIND SOCIETY (2003)). 
32. Rasheena Latham, Who Really Murdered Trayvon? A Critical Analysis of the Relationship Between 
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three students at school notes the teenager was described as a “fine person.”33 
When employers choose to interview a White applicant over a Black applicant, 
and the only difference between the two resumes is the name, racial stereotypes 
are present.34 When professors are more likely to answer an email from a student 
with a White-associated name versus a student with a minority-associated name, 
racially-based assumptions may play a role.35 While the above situations are 
drastically different, a common theme in each is implicit associations between 
character and race. 
A word of caution is appropriate here. The racial associations in the above 
situations may or may not be consciously “racist” (i.e., the individuals making the 
associations may or may not explicitly assign value to racial differences to benefit 
themselves or harm their victims to justify the actor’s “own privileges or 
aggression”).36 Indeed, cognition studies demonstrate that “the operation of 
prejudice and stereotyping in social judgment and behavior does not require 
personal animus, hostility or even awareness.”37 Rather the point in raising 
evidence of implicit bias and cross-cultural issues is to demonstrate that, even 
absent such explicit intentions, our unconscious associations and understandings 
have meaning38—a meaning that is particularly relevant within prisons. 
A. Racial Bias and the Implicit Association Test 
Statistical evidence indicates that race could matter in prison disciplinary 
decisions. Poole and Regoli’s 1980 study, finding that race influences discretionary 
disciplinary decisions, was relatively narrow.39 First, the authors did not study the 
entire disciplinary process, including disciplinary hearings or appeals, but rather 
 
Institutional Racism in the Criminal Justice System and Trayvon Martin’s Death, 8 S.J. POL’Y & JUST. L.J. 80, 82 
n.15 (2014) (contrasting media coverage of Trayvon Martin, an African American homicide victim, 
with Adam Lanza, a non-Black assailant at Sandy Hook Elementary School); see also Bill Chappell, 
People Wonder: ‘If They Gunned Me Down,’ What Photo Would Media Use?, NPR: THE TWO WAY (Aug. 11, 
2014, 2:17 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2014/08/11/339592009/people-wonder-if-
they-gunned-me-down-what-photo-would-media-use (discussing the #IfTheyGunnedMeDown hashtag 
and the media choice of photos for Black victims). 
33. Nick Wing, When the Media Treats White Suspects and Killers Better than Black Victims, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 14, 2014, 8:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/14/media-
black-victims_n_5673291.html [http://perma.cc/VS5W-M774] (collecting examples of headline 
descriptions of Black victims and White suspects). 
34. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than 
Lakisha and Jamal?: A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873. 
35. Katherine L. Milkman et al., What Happens Before?: A Field Experiment Exploring How Pay and 
Representation Differentially Shape Bias on the Pathway into Organizations 17 n.5 (2014), http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2063742. 
36. ALBERT MEMMI, DOMINATED MAN: NOTES TOWARDS A PORTRAIT 194 (1968). 
37. Hardin & Banaji, supra note 1, at 3. 
38. But see L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 115, 119–20 (2014) (noting that self-threats, such as threats to status, perceived disrespect, 
and chronic stress or self-loathing may also play a role in hegemonic racial violence). 
39. Poole & Regoli, supra note 12, at 932. 
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focused on front-line correctional officer decisions as to whether to report a 
prison violation.40 Second, the authors only analyzed seven major violations,41 
specifically excluding “ambiguous” charges such as “being disrespectful to staff, 
menacing or disruptive language,” and “using improper or indecent language or 
gestures.”42 But even within this narrow study, the authors found that race played 
a role. 
The Poole and Regoli data indicate that “[w]hile black and white inmates 
were equally likely to engage in rule-breaking activity, they were not equally likely 
to be reported for rule infractions.”43 The race of the offender affected 
discretionary disciplinary decision-making in two distinct ways. First, a prison 
guard was more likely to report an offender for a rule violation if the offender was 
African American.44 Second, race produced an indirect effect by enhancing the 
importance of a prior disciplinary record.45 Since Black inmates were more likely 
to be reported, they were also more likely to have prior disciplinary histories.46 
Moreover, the importance assigned to a prior disciplinary history differed 
depending on the race of the offender.47 “For whites, rule violations and prior 
record explain 13.5 and 3.6 percent, respectively, of the variation in disciplinary 
actions. For blacks, prior record alone accounts for 48.8 percent of the variation in 
formal response, with rule infractions contributing an additional 2.4 percent.”48 
Poole and Regoli focused on statistically identifying the probability that a 
prisoner’s race correlated with his or her disciplinary experience.49 Although we 
lack modern studies similar to the Poole and Regoli study to prove that race is a 
statistically significant factor in prison disciplinary decisions, other psychological 
studies suggest that race may continue to play a role. 
The “Implicit Association Test” (IAT) is one of many social cognition 
studies examining an individual’s automatic and unconscious response to certain 
stimuli as distinct from his or her explicit or consciously stated responses.50 “The 
IAT measures the strength of associations between concepts (e.g., black people, 
gay people) and evaluations (e.g., good, bad) or stereotypes (e.g., athletic, 
clumsy).”51 Associations between race and evaluations are not static, but they can 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 934–35 n.3. The major infractions surveyed included: out of area, gambling, 
possession of contraband (e.g., drugs, weapons, monies), refusal to obey staff order, theft, fighting, 
and destroying property. Id. 
42. Id. at 936 n.7. 
43. Id. at 944. 
44. Id. at 943–44. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 944. 
48. Id. at 942. 
49. Id. at 933. 
50. About the IAT, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/iatdetails.html 
[https://perma.cc/63PA-RX2B] (last visited Oct. 4, 2015). 
51. Id. 
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be difficult to change.52 Moreover, these implicit racial associations are moderately 
better predictors of future behavior than explicit or conscious associations.53 
In general, these social cognition tests demonstrate that we are not 
“cognitively colorblind.”54 Brian Nosek examined the results of seventeen IAT 
tests over a six-year period with a cumulative total of 2.5 million study 
participants.55 He found a preference for Whites over Blacks, White children over 
Black children, and lighter skin over darker skin.56 Participants more quickly 
associated the word “bad” with Black or darker skin and “good” with White or 
lighter skin.57 
The IAT data is generally consistent, regardless of the race of the participant. 
For example, in an IAT study of fifty participants, thirty-one of whom were 
White, with the remaining members of minority groups or multiracial, eighty 
percent of the participants demonstrated a preference for White over Black, i.e. a 
positive association of White with good and Black with bad.58 Thus, a Black 
person may have an implicit bias or preference for Whites over Blacks.59 This is 
especially important in the field of corrections. Blacks and Latinos are 
disproportionately incarcerated relative to their overall population demographic,60 
but correctional officers come in all colors and are increasingly diverse.61 Thus the 
analysis of implicit bias is not limited to pairings of White correctional officers 
and Black offenders but rather is instructive regardless of the race of either the 
correctional officer or the offender. 
These implicit associations matter in the real world, particularly when 
perception of threat or crime is concerned. In one study, participants were asked 
 
52. Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba & Brian A. Nosek, The Surprising Limited Malleability of Implicit Racial 
Evaluations, 41 SOC. PSYCHOL. 137, 145 (2010); see also Hardin & Banaji, supra note 1, at 7. 
53. CHERYL STAATS & CHARLES PATTON, KIRWAN INSTITUTE, STATE OF THE SCIENCE: 
IMPLICIT BIAS REVIEW 26–27 (2013). 
54. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA 
L. REV. 465, 473 (2010). 
55. Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. 
REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2007). 
56. Id. at 3–4. 
57. Id. at 17. 
58. Damian A. Stanley et al., Implicit Race Attitudes Predict Trustworthiness Judgments and Economic 
Trust Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 7710, 7713–14 (describing results and demographics of 
Study 1, which focused on the relationship between an individual’s implicit bias and his/her 
determinations of whether an unfamiliar Black or White man was trustworthy). 
59. Hardin & Banaji, supra note 1, at 11 (“[A] surprising number of African Americans exhibit 
implicit preference for whites over blacks.”). These findings should not obscure the fact, however, 
that studies also demonstrate that eighty percent of Whites and Asians have an implicit bias against 
Blacks. Id. at 18. 
60. See SAMUEL WALKER ET AL., THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND CRIME 
IN AMERICA 410–11 (1996) (describing the historic disproportionate incarceration of Blacks in the 
U.S.). 
61. Id. at 410 (describing equitable representation of Blacks in correctional supervision and 
custodial staff, while noting that employment of Latino/as in the correctional field is lacking). 
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to categorize images as either a weapon or a tool.62 Prior to categorizing the 
image, a picture of a Black or White face flashed onscreen.63 Participants were 
more likely to falsely identify an item as a weapon when a Black face appeared on 
screen than when a White face appeared on the screen.64 This weapons bias is 
present in other studies, including one where participants were quicker to shoot an 
armed Black person than an armed White person.65 Participants were 
correspondingly slower to “not shoot” when confronted with a picture of a 
weaponless Black person compared to a weaponless White person.66 These results 
were consistent regardless of the race of the deciding participant.67 The perception 
of non-White individuals as “threats” is also clearly demonstrated in studies on 
police use of force.68 Psychological studies document pervasive associations 
between Blackness and criminality.69 One of the leaders in implicit bias studies 
concludes that, “police consistently use greater lethal and non-lethal force against 
non-white suspects than white suspects.”70 
An implicit preference for Whiteness is also evident in harder to measure 
interpersonal relations. Where a person’s IAT reflects a preference for Whites, 
studies show that person is more likely to trust a White person over a Black 
person.71 In addition, another study indicates that “implicit racial prejudice among 
whites predicts quickness to perceive anger in black faces but not white faces.”72 
Together, these two studies could be interpreted to imply that individuals with an 
implicit preference for White are more likely to give the “benefit of the doubt”73 
to a White individual over a Black individual. This “benefit of the doubt” 
advantage may also play a role in guilty/not-guilty determinations. For example, in 
a study of mock jurors, the IAT, and guilty/not-guilty determinations, study 
participants held strong associations between Black-and-guilty relative to White-
and-guilty.74 These implicit associations predicted the way mock jurors evaluated 
ambiguous evidence, such that where the evidence was unclear, the race of the 
mock defendant helped tip the balance.75 
 
62. B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT 
DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2006). 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Kang & Lane, supra note 54, at 482. 
66. Id. 
67. Hardin & Banaji, supra note 1, at 8. 
68. Id. at 8–9. 
69. Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 889–91 (2004). 
70. Hardin & Banaji, supra note 1, at 9. 
71. Stanley et al., supra note 58, at 7711. 
72. Hardin & Banaji, supra note 1, at 10. 
73. Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 
871, 913 (2015). 
74. Justin D. Levinson et al., Guilty by Implicit Racial Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit 
Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 190 (2010). 
75. Id. 
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The application of these general implicit bias studies to decisions made 
within a penal facility raises additional questions. The IAT research to date 
demonstrates that most individuals have an implicit preference for White over 
Black. But perhaps correctional officers, due to their training, are different? An 
IAT study by Joshua Correll et al. specifically examined the differences between 
police and members of the general community and found that police training 
could decrease the influence of racial bias on shoot/nonshoot decisions.76 But 
notably, the study authors did not conclude that training eliminated the influence 
of implicit biases. One potential implication of this study is that we should not 
assume a 1:1 application of the IAT data from the general public to the decisions 
by correctional officers. Rather, depending on the training in a given facility, the 
salience of racial implicit bias may be lessened. 
B. Implications in Prisons 
Prisoners are subject to disciplinary rules that penalize behavior that 
otherwise would not be punishable outside the prison walls. Disciplinary codes 
prohibit inmates from minor acts (such as disrespect) as well as major acts (such 
as fighting or possession of contraband).77 If an inmate is caught engaging in a 
disciplinary violation, correctional staff may, at their discretion, issue a conduct 
report citing the behavior and the violation.78 Under the Court’s due process 
jurisprudence, prisoners are entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard prior to the imposition of sanctions if a liberty or property interest is at 
stake.79 At a disciplinary hearing, the inmate may offer evidence or testify to rebut 
the disciplinary charge.80 The hearing officer (or committee in some 
circumstances) will decide whether the inmate is responsible and, if so, authorize 
sanctions as a punishment for the violation.81 Punishments may be relatively 
minor, such as losing canteen purchasing privileges, or major, such as losing good-
time credits or disciplinary segregation in a single cell for twenty-three hours a 
day.82 Despite the impact of these potential punishments, federal courts have 
denied challenges that specific disciplinary provisions are unconstitutionally 
vague.83 These decisions are particularly noteworthy given the interplay between 
 
76. Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to 
Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1006, 1022 (2007). 
77. See, e.g., TENN. DEP’T OF CORR., DEFINITIONS OF DISCIPLINARY OFFENSES 2–3 (2014), 
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/correction/attachments/502-05.pdf [https://perma.cc/F983-
5DFQ]. 
78. See Donald F. Tibbs, Peeking Behind the Iron Curtain: How Law “Works” Behind Prison Walls, 
16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 137, 147–50 (2006) (summarizing the disciplinary process in Wisconsin). 
79. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556–59, 563–71 (1974). 
80. Id. at 566. 
81. Id. at 571. 
82. See, e.g., Tibbs, supra note 78, at 145–46 (listing types of punishment). 
83. See infra Section II.B; see also James E. Robertson, “Catchall” Prison Rules and the Courts: A 
Study of Judicial Review of Prison Justice, 14 ST. LOUIS UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 153, 166 (1994) (discussing 
cases). 
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the broadly defined provisions and the potential influence of implicit racial 
preferences. 
In general, disciplinary rules are a necessary tool for maintaining order and 
security in prisons by imposing consequences beyond incarceration on 
noncompliant inmates. Inmates, by virtue of their criminal conviction and 
sentence to incarceration, are involuntary twenty-four-hour residents in 
institutions. As a consequence, prisoners forsake many of the rights and privileges 
enjoyed in their prior lives. These rules “simultaneously structure daily life and 
provide the means, or at minimum the rationale, to mete discipline as a form of 
social control.”84 Institutional imperatives, such as efficiency and order, may also 
play a role by requiring uniform treatment of all inmates, such as lights-out 
policies and meal times. 
Disciplinary rules may cover the mundane (dress code violations85) to the 
criminal (prohibition on assault86 or arson87). In some cases, disciplinary rules may 
even be counterintuitive. For example, in Tennessee, attempted suicide is a 
midlevel disciplinary infraction.88 An unsuccessful suicide could be punished by up 
to five days in punitive segregation and/or a loss of up to two months of good-
time credit.89 While the intent of the policy may be to prevent suicides, it 
simultaneously provides an unintended incentive to make sure that suicide 
attempts are successful. But many of the disciplinary rules—even though 
punishing conduct that would be noncriminal outside of the prison walls—are 
directly related to prison security. For example, prisons prohibit the possession of 
“free-world money”90 to curb illegal sales within prisons. If a prisoner is found 
responsible or guilty of a violation, punishments can include loss of certain 
privileges. 
Disciplinary violations are all too common in carceral institutions. The latest 
data from 2004, which is based on nationally representative subsamples, indicates 
that just under half of all state and federal inmates were found guilty of a 
disciplinary offense.91 Some scholars have focused on how the experience (and 
deprivations) of prison, such as overcrowding or sentence length, predicts the 
 
84. Tibbs, supra note 78, at 138 (ethnographic study of prison life in Wisconsin). 
85. See, e.g., TENN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 77, at 2. 
86. Id. at 1. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. Attempted suicide is defined as a “[s]ituation in which an individual has performed an 
actual or seemingly life-threatening behavior with the intent of jeopardizing his/her life or presenting 
the appearance of such intent, but which has not resulted in death.” Id. 
89. TENN. DEP’T OF CORR., DISCIPLINARY PUNISHMENT GUIDELINES 7 (2012), 
https://www.tn.gov/assets/entities/correction/attachments/502-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4WM-
R5XL]. 
90. See, e.g., TENN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 77, at 6. 
91. Katarzyna Celinska & Hung-En Sung, Gender Differences in the Determinants of Prison Rule 
Violations, 94 PRISON JOURNAL 220, 227 (2014). The Celinska & Sung study relied on data from the 
2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional Facilities by the Department of Justice. Id. 
at 224. 
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probability of disciplinary infractions.92 Certainly, some of the rule-breaking 
behavior can also be attributed to the steady increase of the mentally ill in our 
carceral institutions.93 “Jails and prisons have become, in effect, the country’s 
front-line mental health providers.”94 Other scholars argue that the disciplinary 
violations may be predicted based on an inmate’s personal characteristics, such as 
prior abuse, criminal history, age, race, or sex.95 Even without the benefit of 
modern implicit bias studies within the correctional setting, it is nevertheless 
worth thinking about the implications of the existing IAT studies for prison 
discipline. 
First, minority offenders may be more likely to be perceived as a disciplinary 
threat by correctional officers, regardless of an offender’s actual behavior.96 For 
example, a correctional officer may be more likely to perceive contraband in a 
Black offender’s hand than in a White offender’s hand. A prison guard may also 
decide more quickly that a Black offender is a threat as compared to a White 
offender, leading perhaps to increased citations for Black offenders. It is also 
possible that the threat is exaggerated for minority offenders, and therefore, 
minority inmates may face more serious conduct reports than their fellow White 
inmates for the same type of behavior. 
Implicit bias studies may also implicate the severity of the punishment an 
offender would receive for a rule violation. In the death penalty context, 
researchers found that a defendant is more likely to be sentenced to death when 
the defendant has more stereotypical Black features, even controlling for the type 
of crime and mitigating evidence presented.97 Underlying this study is the implicit 
association between a person’s race and whether that person is intrinsically good 
or bad. Thus, a defendant with stereotypical Black features may be more likely to 
be perceived as fundamentally bad and therefore beyond rehabilitation. These 
results are consistent with evidence of implicit racial bias by prosecutors in 
discretionary requests for downward departures in federal sentencing.98 Blacks and 
Hispanics in particular were less likely to receive lesser sentences in return for a 
defendant’s “substantial assistance,” even when controlling for the severity of the 
 
92. Id. at 222–24. 
93. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 16 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1003/usa1003.pdf [http://
perma.cc/S2QR-V4C4]. 
94. Id. 
95. Celinska & Sung, supra note 91, at 222. 
96. Certainly these attitudes implicate the likelihood of the use of force on inmates, but use of 
force is beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, I focus on the implications of these attitudes for 
disciplinary proceedings. 
97. Brian A. Nosek & Rachel G. Riskind, Policy Implications of Implicit Social Cognition, 6 SOC. 
ISSUES & POL’Y REV. 113, 127 (2012). 
98. John Tyler Clemons, Note, Blind Injustice: The Supreme Court, Implicit Racial Bias, and the 
Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 689, 696–97 (2014) (linking implicit 
bias studies of law enforcement with decision-making by prosecutors). 
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crime.99 In the prison disciplinary context, this implicit bias could lead to 
enhanced or more severe punishments for Black inmates than for White inmates 
committing the same violation. 
Finally, implicit bias may be particularly relevant for the minor or ambiguous 
conduct charges100 excluded from the Poole and Regoli study. Some prison rules 
are designed as “vaguely worded ‘catchall’ rules” (i.e., rules that are so broadly 
defined that they provide wide discretion to prison guards tasked with maintaining 
order).101 These “catchall” rules almost always pertain to an inmate’s attitude rather 
than conduct, and they can include prohibitions on “insolence,” “insubordination,” 
and “disrespect.”102 In a 1994 survey, Professor James Robertson noted that at 
least twenty-four states could punish an inmate’s demeanor.103 An inmate’s 
attitude is also relevant for broadly defined disciplinary charges, such as 
“disruptive”104 or “disorderly” behavior or to charges prohibiting “any conduct” 
indicative of a security threat.105 
But what exactly do these terms mean? In Shaw v. Murphy, an inmate was 
charged with “insolence” for writing a letter to a fellow inmate offering assistance 
defending against a charge of assaulting a correctional officer.106 “Insolence” was 
defined as “words, actions or other behavior which is intended to harass or cause 
 
99. David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. 
Federal Courts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 293, 308–09 (2001). 
100. See infra Part II for a deeper discussion of the prison disciplinary system and vague or 
ambiguous charges. 
101. Douglas Dennis, Foreword: A Consumer’s Report, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1994); see, e.g., Robertson, supra note 83, at 168–69 (1994). 
102. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20. 504. App. A, § 304 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Ill. 
Register) (defining insolence as “[t]alking, touching, gesturing, or other behavior that harasses, annoys, 
or shows disrespect”); AL. DEP’T OF CORR., MALE INMATE HANDBOOK 47 (2013) (defining 
insubordination as “[a]ny act, gesture, remark, or statement that reflects disrespect to authority”); 
N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY PRISONS, INMATE DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES 4 (2014), http://
www.doc.state.nc.us/dop/policy_procedure_manual/b200.pdf [http://perma.cc/8WFY-B5EW] 
(prohibiting “[d]irect[ing] toward or us[ing] in the presence of any State official, any member of the 
prison staff, any inmate, or any member of the general public, oral or written language or specific 
gestures or acts that are generally considered disrespectful, profane, lewd, or defamatory” (emphasis 
added)); OR. DEP’T OF CORR., PROHIBITED INMATE CONDUCT AND PROCESSING DISCIPLINARY 
ACTIONS, RULES OF MISCONDUCT § (2)(h), 2.12 (2014), http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/pages/rules/
oars_200/oar_291/291_105.html [http://perma.cc/JEU7-9DG2] (“An inmate commits Disrespect 
III when he/she directs hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening language or gestures, verbal or written, 
towards or about another person.” (emphases added)). 
103. Robertson, supra note 83, at 170. 
104. See MICH. DEP’T OF CORR., POLICY DIRECTIVE NO. 03.03.105, PRISONER DISCIPLINE 
18 (2012), http://www.michigan.gov/documents/corrections/0303105_382060_7.pdf [http://perma
.cc/E4C7-H882] (defining “Creating a Disturbance” as “[a]ctions or words of a prisoner which result 
in disruption or disturbance among others but which does not endanger persons or property”). In 
contrast to many of the other disciplinary infractions, there are no common examples listed to narrow 
the circumstances in which this could apply. 
105. Robertson, supra note 83, at 170–71. 
106. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225–26 (2001) (holding no First Amendment right to 
provide legal assistance to fellow inmates and remanding for consideration of Turner factors for the 
prisoners’ vagueness claims). 
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alarm in an employee” and could include “cursing; abusive language, writing or 
gestures directed to an employee.”107 In Smith v. Mosley, “insubordination” 
consisted of writing a letter to the assistant warden complaining of being forced to 
go outside in subfreezing weather.108 Georgia defines “insubordination” broadly 
to include “cursing, demeaning, or acting in a sullen, uncooperative, or disrespectful 
manner toward any employee.”109 Professor Donald Tibbs recounts a disciplinary 
hearing where an inmate asking a guard why he received a disciplinary ticket that 
amounted to “disruptive conduct.”110 
In this case, the inmate received a conduct report for disruptive conduct 
while he was at work in the kitchen. Upon receiving the ticket, he loudly 
asked the guard, “man what about my warning? Don’t I receive a 
warning?” The guard claimed that the inmate’s actions disrupted the 
work environment with loud talking because the other inmates stopped 
work to look in their direction. The guard also charged that speaking to 
him loudly and referring to him as “man” amounted to disrespect 
according to DOC 303.25.111 
Ambiguous disciplinary rules, particularly those regulating an inmate’s 
attitude, are especially susceptible to the influence by an individual prison guard’s 
implicit racial preferences. Remember that three IAT studies, on trust, anger 
perception, and perceptions of guilt, suggested that race may play a role in 
interpersonal communications. In the prison context, a lack of trust could 
implicate perceptions of whether an inmate is lying in a disciplinary hearing for the 
cited violation. It could also implicate whether an inmate is cited for conduct that 
may be difficult to objectively determine, such as “insolence” or “disrespect,” 
particularly where there is ambiguous evidence. A less trustworthy person may be 
more likely to be perceived as disrespectful of the rules of conduct by a 
correctional officer. White and Black inmates may experience differential 
treatment (being cited or disciplined) for “insolence,” even when acting identically, 
since a prison guard may be more likely to perceive anger from a Black inmate 
than a White inmate. Where violations rely at least in part on interpersonal 
communications, the IAT studies would suggest that race plays a role.  
One side effect of an ambiguous statute is that it provides broad discretion 
for individual prison officers to “redefine prison rules as they see fit” since 
officers lack guidance as to enforcement.112 In such situations, biases not under 
our conscious control provide a lens through which to interpret inmate behavior. 
 
107. Id. at 232 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mont. State Prison 
Policy No. 15-001, Inmate Disciplinary Policy, Rule 009 (App.10)). 
108. Smith v. Mosley, 532 F.3d 1270, 1272–74 (11th Cir. 2008). 
109. GA. DEP’T OF CORR., ORIENTATION HANDBOOK FOR OFFENDERS 27, http://
www.dcor.state.ga.us/pdf/GDC_Inmate_Handbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/78RB-CQVM] (emphasis 
added). 
110. Tibbs, supra note 78, at 160–61. 
111. Id. at 160. 
112. Robertson, supra note 83, at 168. 
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Enforcement then expands beyond the specific conduct at issue to include the 
“attitude” of the defendant. Yet, social cognition studies demonstrate that we 
perceive “attitudes” differently depending on our racial preferences.113 By 
upholding ambiguous attitude disciplinary rules, courts facilitate the influence of 
racial preferences in prison disciplinary proceedings. 
This survey of IAT literature helps to explain the outcome of the 1980 Poole 
and Regoli finding that race affects prison disciplinary decision-making in three 
distinct ways. First, non-White inmates are more likely to be perceived as a threat, 
regardless of the inmate’s actual behavior. Because they are more likely to be 
perceived as a threat, non-White inmates may be cited both more often and for 
more serious conduct than White inmates. Second, the types of punishments for 
these citations may be more severe for non-White inmates than for White inmates. 
Third, the impact of implicit bias may be particularly salient when dealing with 
more ambiguous disciplinary provisions, such that race plays an even larger role in 
determining whether a violation occurred. Despite these potential impacts, the 
jurisprudence to date exclusively penalizes only explicit, and not implicit, bias. 
II. FACILITATING THE INFLUENCE OF RACE 
A. Requiring Intent for Racial Discrimination Claims in Prison 
The consideration of race—whether it occurs outside or inside the prison 
walls—is subject to strict scrutiny. In Johnson v. California, the Supreme Court held 
that strict scrutiny should apply to prison officials’ use of race in determining 
housing assignments for offenders.114 Strict scrutiny, the most searching level of 
judicial review available, requires that the policy be “narrowly tailored measures 
that further compelling governmental interests.”115 In so doing, the Court decided 
not to apply the more lenient doctrine of judicial deference to prison 
administrators under Turner v. Safley.116 And yet, even with a heightened standard 
of review, implicit racial bias claims are rarely legally cognizable because they lack 
the “intent” requirement established in Washington v. Davis for racial discrimination 
claims.117 
Washington v. Davis, an employment law case, fundamentally changed the 
equal protection landscape by requiring an actual intent to racially discriminate to 
qualify for strict scrutiny review by the courts.118 In cases where a law explicitly 
conditions protection or benefits by race, the intent is clear and courts will apply 
 
113. See generally Stanley et al., supra note 58. 
114. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005). 
115. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
116. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (upholding restriction on inmate correspondence 
but denying restriction on inmate marriage). 
117. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237–38 (1976). 
118. Id. at 237–38. 
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strict scrutiny.119 But in cases where a law is facially neutral, such as the 
disciplinary codes discussed above, a plaintiff must show evidence of 
discriminatory purpose to avoid application of “rational basis review,” a much 
more forgiving and lenient standard of judicial review.120 
Despite considerable criticism, the Court continues to apply Washington v. 
Davis to Fourteenth Amendment disparate impact cases.121 In practice, the Court 
is requiring evidence of explicit racial bias, i.e. racial preferences that are under the 
conscious control of the decision maker. Proving an explicit bias is incredibly 
difficult absent a “smoking gun” statement indicating a desire to harm a person 
because of his or her race. While technically possible to infer such an explicit 
preference from surrounding circumstances, successful claims under the Equal 
Protection Clause are rare.122 For cases concerning implicit bias, where the racial 
preference is not under the conscious control of the decision maker, the burden of 
proof to establish discriminatory intent is exponentially harder. 
A court would likely require evidence of discriminatory purpose to challenge 
prison disciplinary decisions as imposing a disparate impact on a racial group 
under McCleskey v. Kemp.123 In McCleskey, the petitioner confronted the Court with 
stark statistical evidence of the disparate imposition of the death penalty on Black 
defendants convicted of killing White victims in Georgia. A defendant was 4.3 
times more likely to receive the death penalty if the defendant was Black and the 
victim was White.124 While acknowledging the validity of the statistical study, the 
Court nevertheless refused to apply strict scrutiny because McCleskey had failed to 
 
119. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) 
(holding racial classification for purposes of student school assignment violated the Equal Protection 
Clause under strict scrutiny). 
120. Discriminatory purpose includes a showing that the law was enacted “‘because of,’ not 
merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
121. See, e.g., Edward Patrick Boyle, Note, It’s Not Easy Bein’ Green: The Psychology of Racism, 
Environmental Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L. REV. 
937, 963–67 (1993) (arguing that the discriminatory purpose requirement in environmental racism 
cases fails to account for different types of racism); Lawrence III, supra note 11, at 323–24 (arguing 
that the “cultural meaning” of an act better predicts underlying racism than the discriminatory intent 
requirement). It would appear that the Supreme Court is more approving of “disparate impact” cases 
based on statutory rights, such as the Fair Housing Act, than for claims arising solely under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmties. Project, 
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (holding that the language of the Fair Housing Act indicates a concern for 
the consequences of an act as compared to the intent of the actor). 
122. See, e.g., City of Cuyahoga Falls, Ohio v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 194 
(2003) (holding that while intent may be inferred from the circumstances, evidence was nevertheless 
insufficient to attribute a discriminatory purpose to state actors in allowing a referendum to take 
place); see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1977) 
(listing factors to be considered for inferring discriminatory intent in disparate outcome cases 
including the historical background, the legislative history, the specific sequence of events leading up 
to the decision, and any procedural or substantive departures from normal practice). 
123. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
124. Id. at 287. 
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demonstrate discriminatory purpose in his specific case.125 At a superficial level, 
the similarities would be striking. Like McCleskey, prisoners would present 
statistical evidence on racial differences in disciplinary decisions. Like McCleskey, 
prisoners would likely lack specific evidence of explicit bias in their particular 
disciplinary cases. 
Nevertheless, there are important distinctions between the criminal appeal by 
McCleskey and a prisoner’s civil claim of implicit racial bias in prison decision-
making. First, the Court justified the outcome in McCleskey by arguing that the 
state lacked a real opportunity to explain the alleged racial disparity, in part 
because the convicting jury members could not be called to testify.126 While 
disciplinary processes may differ from facility to facility, in most cases, disciplinary 
hearings do not provide for jury decision-making.127 Instead, much like the Title 
VII cases where disparate impact evidence is allowed,128 prison disciplinary 
hearings are conducted by a single officer. Like an employer, that officer is 
available to rebut a prima facie case of alleged racial discrimination. 
Second, the Court hinted that the decision makers in McCleskey’s case were 
simply too varied to attribute racial bias from any one actor or to conclude that 
the particular actor’s bias controlled the sentencing decision.129 Prison disciplinary 
cases could be distinguished on the basis that the prison disciplinary system is 
unitary and lacks the variation implicit in hundreds of juries. But such subtle 
distinctions are unlikely to receive judicial approval given the unwavering 
adherence to Washington v. Davis in equal protection cases since 1976. 
B. Undermining the Intent Requirement in Prisons 
In Johnson v. California, Garrison Johnson, an African American who had been 
incarcerated since 1987, challenged an unwritten policy of temporary racial 
classification in California state prisons as a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.130 The policy, acknowledged by the 
California Department of Corrections, assigned new and transfer inmates to 
temporary quarters based primarily on their race.131 The Department of 
Corrections argued that the racial classification policy was necessary to protect 
new and transfer inmates in two-person cells from racially motivated gang 
violence.132 
The Court specifically justified applying strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause, instead of the more lenient Turner standard, to racial 
 
125. Id. at 293–94. 
126. Id. at 296. 
127. See, e.g., Calavita & Janness, supra note 17, at 33–37. 
128. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 226 (approvingly citing Texas Dep’t. of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981)). 
129. Id. at 295. 
130. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 503 (2005). 
131. Id. at 502. 
132. Brief for Respondents at 30, Johnson, 543 U.S. 499 (No. 03-636). 
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discrimination claims within prisons.133 Some of the arguments for strict scrutiny 
apply regardless of whether a person is incarcerated or not. For example, in her 
majority opinion, Justice O’Connor first relies on precedent, namely Adarand,134 
City of Richmond,135 and more recently, Grutter,136 for the proposition that racial 
classifications imposed by the government are subject to strict scrutiny because 
only a searching judicial review will “smoke out” invidious uses of racial 
classifications.137 Thus, the purpose of employing strict scrutiny is because 
improper racial motivations may be hidden or not easily discernable. But 
O’Connor’s majority opinion also justifies the use of strict scrutiny specifically 
because of the potential impact of race-based decision-making within the prison 
walls. 
Applying a more stringent standard to racial discrimination claims in prison, 
according to the majority opinion, does not impede a prison’s responsibility to 
maintain order and security. The more lenient Turner standard only governs those 
rights that must be “compromised for the sake of proper prison 
administration.”138 Thus, the right to freedom of association, for example, may be 
subject to a lower level of review under Turner because full recognition of those 
rights would harm orderly operation of the prison.139 But Justice O’Connor 
reasoned that individualized consideration of a prisoner’s criminal and disciplinary 
history is more conducive to the goals of order and security than generalized race-
based decision-making. 
In fact, consideration of race can enhance threats to the security and order of 
a prison. The Court noted that prohibiting racial discrimination could actually 
assist in the maintenance of order and security by “bolster[ing] the legitimacy of 
the entire criminal justice system.”140 In the prison disciplinary context, order and 
security depend in part on the consent of the governed.141 If prisoners believe that 
disciplinary violations improperly take the race of the inmate into account, 
prisoners are less likely to respect both the rules themselves and the prison guards 
who enforce them.142 But to the extent that the rules and enforcers are perceived 
to be race-neutral, inmates are more likely to cooperate.143 
 
133. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510. 
134. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
135. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality 
opinion). 
136. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
137. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506. 
138. Id. at 510. 
139. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003). 
140. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510–11. 
141. Jonathan Jackson et al., Legitimacy and Procedural Justice in Prisons, 191 PRISON SERVICE J. 4, 
4 (2010). 
142. See id. at 5. 
143. Id. at 10. 
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Justice O’Connor also noted that the use of race in prison decision-making 
may actually enhance the potential for racial hostility.144 To the extent that inmates 
are aware of the influence of race in the prison disciplinary process, inmates may 
attempt to use that advantage along racial lines to minimize being caught violating 
the rules or receive a more lenient punishment. Minority inmates may resent not 
only the prison guards for their implicit biases, but also White inmates as the 
beneficiaries of the bias. 
Last, the majority opinion relied on the unique situation of custodial 
incarceration where the government’s power is at its “apex.”145 In the context of 
prison disciplinary policies, the government’s power is even further amplified 
beyond the power inherent in maintaining twenty-four hour custody and control 
of the incarcerated. For disciplinary violations, the prison administration assumes 
all of the traditionally separate criminal justice roles of police, prosecutor, judge, 
jury, and appellate court. These roles are separate within the criminal justice 
system in part to facilitate nonarbitrary decisions by dividing responsibilities 
among several actors. The combination of these responsibilities within one 
decision maker presents the opportunity for decisions that are not impartial. This 
danger is amplified by the potential for arbitrary decisions, given the lack of 
standard checks and balances in the disciplinary process.146 
The underlying rationales in the Johnson opinion would appear to support an 
argument that because of the unique circumstances of incarceration, race-based 
decision-making within prisons is different. The three prison-specific rationales 
(the importance of individualized consideration, the danger of racial hostility, and 
the breadth and depth of the government’s power) are applicable in situations of 
implicit as well as explicit racial bias. An implicit racial preference undermines 
individualized consideration just as much as an explicit bias, where race becomes a 
proxy for certain attitudes and assumed behaviors. Causation, i.e. whether the 
preference improperly influenced the outcome, is unclear. Whether racial bias 
caused the outcome may matter less than the perception of whether race matters and 
thus the potential for racial hostility. And it could be argued that implicit racial 
bias is more pernicious in carceral situations than explicit racial bias because of the 
lack of traditional checks and balances. Use of explicit racial preferences is widely 
unacceptable and thus improper reliance on explicit racial biases is more likely to 
be quashed, even in systems without adequate checks and balances. And yet, 
 
144. Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507. 
145. Id. at 511. 
146. The traditional separation of powers into three branches is simply not present in the 
correctional context. Outside of the prison walls, the legislature defines the crimes, the executive 
prosecutes the crimes, and the judiciary assesses the culpability of the accused. Within the prison 
walls, the definition of violations, the prosecution, and the assessment are all performed by the prison 
administration itself. See, e.g., Tibbs, supra note 78, at 147–50 (summarizing the disciplinary process in 
Wisconsin); see also James E. Robertson, Impartiality and Prison Disciplinary Tribunals, 17 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 301, 334 (1991) (recommending “outsider” adjudication of major 
disciplinary charges because of a lack of impartiality by prison officers). 
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jurisprudence to date dictates that this higher level of scrutiny is only available for 
claims of intentional, not implicit, racial discrimination. 
As implicit bias research has progressed, there is overwhelming evidence that 
implicit racial preferences affect everyday decision-making. Extrapolating the 
results of these tests to the prison disciplinary context indicates that implicit biases 
have the potential to influence prison disciplinary decisions. And even though the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits the inappropriate use of race, the influence of 
implicit bias—by definition—eludes judicial notice. By requiring discriminatory 
purpose in all cases of unequal application of facially neutral laws, courts may 
facilitate the undercover use of race in prison disciplinary decision-making. 
III. VALIDATING THE INFLUENCE OF RACE IN PRISONS 
Thus far, the Article has focused on the potential influence of race on prison 
disciplinary decisions and how courts may facilitate that influence by failing to give 
doctrinal credence to implicit bias research. But courts potentially do more than 
passively facilitate—through extended deference to prison disciplinary rules and 
decisions, courts may effectively validate the improper influence of race on prison 
disciplinary decisions. 
Deference to prison administrative decisions is usually justified on two basic 
grounds. First, the Supreme Court has noted that, “[w]e must accord substantial 
deference to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a 
significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system 
and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.”147 
Deference, then, is appropriate because courts lack the special knowledge to 
administer correctional institutions.148 Second, deference is preferred because 
prison administrators need flexibility to fulfill their primary obligation of 
maintaining order and security.149 This flexibility is essential because of the 
“volatile” nature of the prison environment.150 
Inmates have contested their disciplinary violations, in part, by arguing that 
the disciplinary rule is unconstitutionally vague in both facial and as applied 
 
147. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361, 391 
(1995); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 91 (1987) (upholding restriction on inmate correspondence 
but denying restriction on inmate marriage); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546, 562 (1979); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974); see also Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826–27 (1974). 
148. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006). Even if the Court’s claim that it lacks expertise 
in prison management is true in general, I would argue that courts to do have relevant expertise as to 
the specific topic of prison disciplinary hearings. Prison disciplinary hearings, similar to standard 
judicial proceedings, allow for evaluations of credibility, the presentation of evidence, witness 
testimony, and determinations of responsibility. See, e.g., Tibbs, supra note 78, at 148–58 (describing 
the disciplinary process for minor and major violations). 
149. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989). 
150. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482, 484 (1995) (holding that an inmate demonstrates a 
protected liberty interest when the prison decision enacts an “atypical and significant hardship on the 
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”). 
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challenges. Drawing from the First Amendment context, prison disciplinary 
regulations are considered vague when they fail to give a “person of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.”151 Due process 
requires that disciplinary rules be sufficiently clear to give notice to prisoners of 
the scope of prohibited conduct.152 Except for a few cases from the 1980s, courts 
have rarely held disciplinary rules to be vague on their face regarding attitudinal 
disciplinary rules.153 Courts have been more willing to find disciplinary rules as 
unconstitutionally vague as applied,154 although by and large courts have upheld 
ambiguous disciplinary rules. The Supreme Court has specifically noted the 
relevance of deference to correctional officials, even while declining to address a 
prisoner’s due process claim.155 
In Murphy v. Shaw, the Ninth Circuit upheld a prison regulation prohibiting 
“insolence” even while noting that “clearer language could be imagined.”156 The 
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit on other grounds (whether Mr. 
Murphy’s speech was protected under the First Amendment), and Justice 
Ginsburg concurred to note that the Court did not address Mr. Murphy’s due 
process challenge.157 Nevertheless, the case is significant for understanding how 
malleable prison disciplinary rules can be. As noted previously, “insolence” 
constitutes “words, actions or other behavior which is intended to harass or cause 
alarm in an employee” and can include “cursing; abusive language, writing or 
gestures directed to an employee.”158 Mr. Murphy wrote a letter offering his legal 
assistance to a prisoner criminally charged with assaulting a prison guard.159 In 
addition, Mr. Murphy shared his knowledge that the guard in question had 
previously engaged in sexual assaults and retaliation against other inmates at that 
 
151. See Chatin v. Coombe, 186 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting U.S. v. Strauss, 999 F.2d 
692, 697 (2d Cir. 1993)). Chatin held that a disciplinary rule barring unauthorized religious services was 
vague as applied to a prisoner’s individual silent prayer. Id. at 91; see also Cassels v. Stalder, 342 F. 
Supp. 2d 555, 564–67 (M.D. La. 2004) (holding that rule prohibiting “spreading rumors” was vague 
when prison officials testified that a rumor could be either true or false and was designated as such 
pursuant to prison administrative discretion). 
152. Chatin, 186 F.3d at 87; Noren v. Straw, 578 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Mont. 1982). 
153. See Jenkins v. Werger, 564 F. Supp. 806, 807–08 (D. Wyo. 1983) (holding statute barring 
“unruly or disorderly” conduct was void for vagueness); Noren, 578 F. Supp. at 6 (finding rule 
requiring inmates to act in an “orderly decent manner with respect for the rights of the other 
inmates” was vague). 
154. See Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 369 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting no need to decide if 
prison rule prohibiting “disruptive conduct” was facially unconstitutional but finding rule was 
unconstitutional as applied since no prior notice that signing a petition would be considered 
disruptive). 
155. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001). 
156. Murphy v. Shaw, 195 F. 3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Shaw 
v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001). The Ninth Circuit only addressed whether the rule was facially vague 
and not as applied to Mr. Murphy’s circumstances. Id. 
157. Shaw, 532 U.S. at 232. 
158. Id. at 232 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Mont. State Prison Policy No. 15-001, 
Inmate Disciplinary Policy, Rule 009 (App.10)). 
159. Id. at 225–26. 
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institution.160 According to the prison, Mr. Murphy’s comments were deemed 
“insolent,” even though his comments were directed to another inmate and not 
the officer in question.161 Moreover, the hearing officer upheld the disciplinary 
charge because the “statement indicates unprofessional actions which tend to 
intimidate the employee.”162 But the record also lacked evidence that the 
statements made to another inmate were intended to “harass or cause alarm in” 
the prison guard.163 In sum, statements to another inmate regarding arguably 
criminal conduct by a prison guard, even if not directly conveyed to the prison 
guard, may constitute insolence. 
Though the Ninth Circuit did not address his “as applied” due process 
challenge, the court hinted that deference was appropriate for his “facial” 
challenge. The disciplinary regulation is of the “sort that every prison enforces in 
order to maintain order.”164 Implied in this justification is the same institutional 
competence idea underlying judicial deference to prison officials. Prisons, rather 
than courts, are best positioned to determine the regulations necessary to preserve 
order. And while most observers may agree with this proposition as a general 
matter, the Supreme Court also recognized that there must be limits to prison 
decision-making because “prisoners do not shed all constitutional rights at the 
prison gate.”165 
This general standard of deference is also a feature of judicial review of 
prison disciplinary decisions. An inmate may challenge the validity of her 
disciplinary conviction through seeking a writ of habeas corpus.166 Courts will 
review claims that a prison disciplinary conviction violated due process under the 
“some evidence” standard.167 The “some evidence” standard is satisfied when 
 
160. Id. at 226. 
161. Id. 
162. Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Aid Society of N.Y., et al. in Support of Respondent at 21, 
Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001) (No. 99-1613), 2000 WL 1845914. 
163. Id. at 29. 
164. Murphy v. Shaw, 195 F. 3d 1121, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223. 
165. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995). The Sandin Court held that placement in 
administrative segregation must be an “atypical and significant hardship” to implicate a liberty interest 
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 500. 
166. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648–49 (1997) (holding that a 42 U.S.C. §1983 suit for 
damages for biased disciplinary hearing under due process necessarily implied the invalidity of his 
disciplinary conviction and therefore must be brought as a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (holding that a damages suit under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 is prohibited where the claim challenges the substance of the disciplinary conviction). 
But see Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649–50 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (agreeing that bias claim would 
undermine validity of disciplinary procedure, but that the inmate’s claim that the disciplinary hearing 
violated due process by failing to provide written statement of reasons and evidence would not 
undermine disciplinary conviction and therefore is cognizable as a damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983). 
167. Note that federal appellate courts are currently divided on whether an inmate must claim 
a protected liberty interest at stake in order to claim a due process violation. The Ninth Circuit has 
held that minimal procedural safeguards apply even when the prisoner lacks a demonstrated liberty 
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“there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by 
the disciplinary board.”168 The “some evidence” rule is even less than the 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard and essentially only protects against 
arbitrary decisions.169 Nor must the reviewing court fully review the record. 
Determining whether there is “some evidence” “does not require examination of 
the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or 
weighing of the evidence.”170 
Inmates can be unruly and difficult. For many, it is a challenge to cede 
complete control over their lives to the prison administration. Some inmates may 
in fact rebel against this control by actively challenging prison authority or by 
manipulating events to their advantage. But the point of this discussion is not 
whether the inmates were in fact insolent or insubordinate, however those terms 
are defined. Rather the point is to recognize that courts almost never reach these 
questions, thus giving legal imprimatur to disciplinary decisions that may have 
been influenced by implicit racial preferences. 
Courts that have reviewed disciplinary conviction challenges almost 
universally conclude that the “some evidence” standard is met in reviewing 
disciplinary convictions for attitude offenses. The Seventh Circuit found the 
standard satisfied in Portee v. Vannatta, noting that, “the conduct report alone 
provides ‘some evidence’ that he was guilty of insolence.”171 In Cardenas v. Adler, a 
California federal district court found “some evidence” to support the disciplinary 
charge for insolence even though “the evidence [could not] be characterized as 
overwhelming.”172 In that case, the evidence consisted solely of a prison staff 
member’s testimony that the inmate “yelled” and “threw” a bottle of cream.173 But 
we also know that depending on the prison guard’s implicit biases, whether 
someone “yelled” or “threw” something can be a subjective determination, much 
 
interest. See Burnsworth v. Gunderson, 179 F.3d 771, 774–75 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding procedural due 
process violation when “no shred of evidence of the inmate’s guilt is presented” at disciplinary 
hearing, even when a protected liberty interest is not at stake). But see Lee v. Karriker, No. 6:o8cv328, 
2009 WL 2590093, at *4, *8–9 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2009), aff’d, 383 F. App’x 491 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that Fifth Circuit does require a protected liberty interest to claim due process protection, 
even where the claim is that no evidence was presented to support the disciplinary conviction). 
168. Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455–56 (1985) (emphasis added) (upholding right to due 
process protection for prison disciplinary proceeding that affected inmate’s good time credits, but 
finding sufficient evidence to satisfy the “some evidence” standard). But see Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 
S. Ct. 859, 862 (2011) (holding that “some evidence” standard did not apply to state-created liberty 
interest in parole decision). 
169. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999). 
170. Walpole, 472 U.S. at 455. 
171. Portee v. Vannatta, Nos. 04-1080, 04-1082, 2004 WL 1662289, at *2 (7th Cir. July 20, 
2004). 
172. Cardenas v. Adler, No. 1:09-cv-00831, 2010 WL 2180378, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 
2010). 
173. Id. at *4. 
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like whether a person is holding a weapon or a tool or whether a sentence is 
considered threatening based on the speaker.174 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has endeavored to discover the potential linkages between 
implicit biases and their potential influence on prison disciplinary decisions. The 
cognitive studies on implicit preferences are clear that preferences outside of a 
person’s conscious control can influence perceptions and behavior. But the failure 
to recognize implicit racial preferences as indicative of racial discrimination 
facilitates the continuing influence of race in prison decision-making by allowing 
the role of race to escape judicial review. Ambiguous attitudinal disciplinary 
charges may then enable the use of these implicit biases by prison officials, 
particularly where prison officials have broad enforcement discretion. By 
upholding these “catchall” disciplinary rules against vagueness challenges, courts 
may allow the improper influence of implicit racial preferences. The influence of 
these preferences may then be validated by courts reviewing prison disciplinary 
decisions under the deferential “some evidence” standard. 
These linkages are possible, but certainly not proven in this Article. Data on 
the use of attitudinal charges by prison disciplinary officials are either lacking or 
outdated. Social cognition studies to date have not examined the role of implicit 
racial biases specifically in the prison disciplinary context. It may well be that a 
prisoner’s status as an “inmate” takes precedence over perceptions of a prisoner’s 
race. Hence, it would be premature to offer suggestions to decrease the potential 
influence of unconscious racial biases on prison disciplinary proceedings. But 
perhaps, by sketching out the potential interactions, we can strategically advocate 
for more responsive legal doctrines from the courts and more detailed information 
from prison administrators. Elsewhere, I have argued for enhanced data collection 
from prisons under a federal incentive regime, similar to the data collected for 
schools.175 In that piece, I argued specifically for the collection of data regarding 
the disciplinary and grievance process in prisons.176 Such data is critical for further 




174. Payne, supra note 62; Poole & Regoli, supra note 12. 
175. Armstrong, supra note 2, at 469–75. 
176. Id. at 472–73. 
